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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DISMISSED
MR. PETT'S PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF.
POINT I
THE APPELLEES "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" FALSELY REPRESENTS
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE TO THIS COURT.
5

In their "Statement of Facts," the appellees falsely assert that:
The petition for extraordinary relief arises out of the Petitioner's request to nullify
Judge Marx's appointment as a temporary judge in Petitioner's criminal
misdemeanor case. (Appellees' brief, page 12, ^f 2 )
That assertion is a deliberate false representation of the facts of this case. Judge Marx
(hereinafter, "Marx") was not appointed to act as a tempo raiy justice court judge for Mr.
Pett's case. At no time during the Box Elder County Conmiission hearing was Mr. Pett's
name ever mentioned. At no time during the Commission meeting did either Mr.
Hadfield or Judge Christensen (hereinafter, "Christensen") ever state, suggest or even
imply that Marx was being appointed as justice court judge for Mr. Pett's case. See the
Transcript of the December 8, 2008. The Box Elder County Commission attempted to
appoint Marx as a "temporary justice court judge" for Box Elder County, without
specifying that he was being appointed for any specific case, and specifically stating that
his "appointment" was without any limit on the duration of the appointment.
The appellees also falsely assert that Mr. Pert filed his Petition for Extraordinary
Relief on December 1, 2009. (Appellees' brief, page 12, If 2.) The appellees then claim
that Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief was dismissed on June 15, 2009, five and
one half months before the appellees claim he filed it.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT RULED
THAT MARX WAS PROPERLY AND LAWFULLY APPOINTED AS A
JUSTICE COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY, WHEN THE BOX
ELDER COUNTY COMMISSION FAILED TO APPOINT HIM IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UCA §78A-2-202.
A. The Box Elder County Commission Was Required To Comply With All Of The
Requirements Set Forth In UCA §78A-7-202(3)(a)- And UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b)
When It Attempted To Appoint Marx As A Temporary Justice Court Judge.
Contrary to the appellees' assertions, the Box Elder County Commission was
required to comply with all of the requirements set forth in UCA §78A-7-202, when it
attempted to appoint Marx as a temporaiy justice court judge, not just selected parts of it.
In pertinent part, Rule 29(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
when a justice court judge is disqualified or recuses himself, the appointment of a
replacement judge must be made in accordance with the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202.
Rule 29 URCriP states that assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138. UCA §78-5-138 was renumbered to UCA §78A-7-202 at the
time of Marx's attempted appointment. Rule 29 URCrip, does not state, suggest or even
imply, as the appellees would ask this Court to believe, that the appointment of a
replacement or temporaiy justice court judge does not need to comply with all of the
requirements mandated in UCA §78A-7-202 for the appointment of a temporary justice
court judge.
Likewise, UCA §78A-7-202 does not state, suggest or even imply, as the appellees
would ask this Court to believe, that the appointment of a temporaiy justice court judge
does not need to comply with all of the requirements specified in UCA §78A-7-202.
Nowhere in UCA §78A-7-202 is there any indication whatsoever that its mandates only
apply to "newly appointedjudicial officer not holding judicial office, " rather than to all
-2-

appointments as a justice court judge, including temporary conflict appointments.
The version of §78A-7-202(3)(a) in effect at the time of Marx's alleged
appointment as a Box Elder County justice court judge stated: "After a newly appointed
justice court judge has been confirmed, the local legislative body shall report the
confirmedjudge's name to the Judicial Council. " (Emphasis added). It does not state
that the "legislative body shall report the confirmedjudge's name to the Judicial
Council " only if the justice court judge is a "newly appointedjudicial officer not holding
judicial office, " as the appellees falsely assert.
The version of UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) in effect at the time of Marx's alleged
appointment as a Box Elder County justice court judge stated:
The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications
for office. (Emphasis added).
It does not state that the Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office
upon successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications for
office, only if the judge is a "newly appointed judicial officer not holding judicial office, "
as the appellees falsely assert.
The appellees claim that there is no "legitimate legislative purpose " in requiring
the Box Elder County Commission to comply with the provisions of UCA §78A-7202(3)(a) and UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b). As support for that assertion the appellees claim
that:
// is inferred, based on Judge Marx's standing as a current judge in the judicial
district that he may exercise judicial authority upon appointment, absent
presentment to the Judicial Council, because he already has core judicial
functions and qualifies to perform judicial opinions on disqualification motions for
-3-

the county under Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, the appellees have not cited to, and cannot cite to, any provision of the Utah
Code, any provision of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, any case law, or any
legislative histoiy that states, suggests or even implies that an individual appointed as a
temporary justice court judge is not subject to all of the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202.
Likewise, the appellees have not cited to, and cannot cite to, any provision of the
Utah Code, any provision of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, any case law, or any
legislative histoiy that states, suggests or even implies they are permitted to ignore any
provision of the Utah Code simply because they believe "// serves no legitimate
legislative purpose, " or is (loverly burdensome and unnecessary. "
The appellees do not have the right to ignore any provision of the Utah Code
simply because they believe "// serves no legitimate legislative purpose, " or is lioverly
burdensome and unnecessary. " If the appellees think that they are permitted to simply
ignore the express provisions of UCA §78A-7-202(3)(a) and UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b),
then they are required to challenge the validity of those sections of the Utah Code in
court. But they are not entitled to simply ignore them because they believe they serve no
legitimate purpose or because they are overly burdensome and unnecessary.
The appellees have admitted that they did not comply with the provisions of either
UCA §78A-7-202(3)(a) or UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) when they attempted to appoint Marx
as a temporaiy justice court judge in Box Elder County. Therefore, because the appellees
did not comply with the provisions of either §78A-7-202(3)(a) or UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b)
when they attempted to appoint Marx as a temporaiy justice court judge in Box Elder
County, his attempted appointment is invalid, as a matter of law, and nothing he has done
either before or after his alleged appointment is valid, or can retroactively be made valid.
-4-

B. The Box Elder County Commission's Attempt To Appoint Mara To An Indefinite
Term As A "Temporary Justice Court Judge" In Box Elder County Was Unlawful.
Thus Making His Attempted Appointment Invalid As A Matter Of Law.
In their brief, the appellees make the following statement:
A temporary judge is appointed only to the limited context of the absence, or
disqualification of the assignedjudge. UCA §78A-7-208. The intent of the statute
is to grant extended authority and subject matter jurisdiction for experienced
judicial officers for the limited purpose of assisting with conflict cases.
(Appellees' brief, page 18, \ 2).
That assertion is not only simply the appellees' opinion, speculation, conjecture, and/or
conclusion, it is also legally incorrect.
A judge does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter is conferred
upon a court not a judge. Subject matter jurisdiction is based on the legal standing of the
court to entertain a case and controversy. Salt Lake City, v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah
1994). It is not based on a particular judge's legal standing to entertain the case or
controversy, as the appellees falsely claim.
Additionally, there is nothing in UCA §78A-7-208 that states, suggests, or even
implies that "The intent of the statute is to grant extended authority and subject matter
jurisdiction for experiencedjudicial officers for the limited purpose of assisting with
conflict cases, " as the appellees falsely claim. As previously established in this Brief,
there is no mention of temporary justice court judges in UCA §78A-7-208, or any
indication that temporary justice court judges are to be treated any differently under its
provisions than is any other justice court judge.
And again, the appellees have not cited, and cannot cite this Court to any provision
of the Utah Code, any Rule of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or any case law that
states, suggests, or even implies that "The intent of the statute is to grant extended
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authority and subject matter jurisdiction for experiencedjudicial officers for the limited
purpose of assisting with conflict cases, " as the appellees falsely claim.
The appellees next make the false and ludicrous assertion that "In this case, Judge
Marx was assigned Petitioner's misdemeanor case at the request of the Petitioner. "
(Appellees' brief, page 18, ^ 3). The appellees then make another false statement to wit:
"Petitioner filed a motion to recuse Judge Christensen and Judge Marx was appointed. "
(Appellees' brief, page 18, ^ 3), (Emphasis added).
Mr. Pett never requested that Marx be assigned his case, as the appellees falsely
claim, and there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Pett ever requested that Marx
be assigned to his case, as the appellees falsely claim. Mr. Pett thought that Kevin
Nelson, the justice court judge in Mantua, would be assigned the case, as he was in all
cases before 2008. Additionally, Mr. Pett did not file a motion to "recuse Judge
Christensen " as the appellees falsely claim. He filed a motion to disqualify Christensen,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP. Furthermore, Marx was not specifically
appointed to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case, as the appellees falsely claim.
Christensen simply assigned the case to Marx to act as the justice court judge in Mr.
Pett's case, in total disregard of both Rule 29, URCriP and UCA §78A-7-202.
In the Box Elder County Commission hearing of December 8, 2008, when asked
by Commissioner Van Dyke why they are asking the Commission to appoint Mark as a
justice court judge in December 2008, if it has been a requirement to have him validly
appointed since January of 2008, Christensen states:
/ think its just been done and nobody has taken - - care is not the right word. But
the - - the attorneys who have come in and the defendants who have come in have
always just felt comfortable bringing in another judge. It's never really been
thought about. You know, we deal with so many codes and so many things every
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day, I think it 'sjust something that was never really thought about before.
(Page 9, lines 2-12).
At the December 8, Box Elder County Commission Hearing Christensen also states:
/ would hope that it - - more than anything, it wouldjust be who I feel comfortable
with I mean, I don 7 know that it's - - it doesn 7 say that it's my decision, but I- / - -1 know the other judges in the district felt really comfortable with him coming
in. So it 'sjust - - it's purely from my side that I yve brought Judge Marx in.
(Page 12, lines 4-14).
At the December 8, Box Elder County Commission Hearing Christensen further stated, in
response to Commissioner Davis' question about how many times the county has used
Marx in the past, "Oh, maybe half a dozen times is all " (Page 6, lines 24-25).
The appellees' assertion that:
The county's appointment temporary appointment is therefore complete and
whether Petitioner's misdemeanor case takes three to five years to reach a trial or
sentence, the appointment of Judge Marx should remain so long as he maintains
his office as a justice court judge within the judicial district, remains in good
standing with the Judicial Council, and Box Elder County Commission approves
of the appointment, (Appellee's brief, pages 18-19, fs 3-1),
is nonsense. If Marx had in fact been appointed as a temporaiy justice court judge in Box
Elder County specifically for Mr. Pett's case, then perhaps, the appellees would have a
colorable claim that Marx's appointment as a temporaiy justice court judge for Mr. Pett's
case did not need to specify a duration of the appointment, but his appointment would
still not retro actively validate any of his decisions or rulings or other actions prior to his
appointment. However, Marx was not appointed as a justice court judge specifically for
Mr. Pett's case, as the appellees falsely claim. Marx was allegedly appointed as a
"temporary justice court judge" for all past and future cases in Box Elder County and
that alleged appointment was "indefinite, " as shown from the Transcript of the December
8, 2008, Box Elder County Commission meeting.
-7-

Commissioner Davis: "So, Steve, as I understand it then the appointment would be
to appoint David Marx as a temporary justice court judge, and then that
appointment is indefinite? "
Steven Hadfield: "That's right"
Commissioner Davis: "That's right. " (Page 9, lines 18-23)
Neither Mr. Pett nor his case is mentioned in the Commission meeting. It is, therefore,
undisputable that Marx was appointed as a "temporary justice court judge " for all of his
past and future cases in Box Elder County, not specifically for Mr. Pett's case, as the
appellees are falsely asserting, and that alleged appointment of Marx was "indefinite. "
In footnote 2 of the appellees' brief, the appellees make the following false
assertion:
Presumably, Judge Marx may retain his appointment as a temporary judge on
Petitioner's case if he retires within the judicial district. However, if Judge Marx
transfers or assumes another justice court judgeship outside of the judicial
district, Judge Marx no longer qualifies as for a temporary judgeship appointment
under UCA §78A-7-208.
Again, Marx was never appointed as a temporary justice court judge specifically
for Mr. Pett's case. Marx was allegedly appointed as a "temporary justice court judge"
for all past and future cases in Box Elder County, not just Mr. Pett's case, and that
alleged appointment was "indefinite. " If Marx had been lawfully appointed as a justice
court judge specifically for Mr. Pett's case, then he would be permitted to remain as the
justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case throughout the duration of the case. And contrary,
to the appellees' assertion, Marx would be entitled to remain as the justice court judge in
Mr. Pett's case even if he left the district, the state, or the countiy, unless his appointment
was somehow rescinded.
However, the appellees' assertion that Marx would no longer be authorized to act
as the justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case, assuming he had been lawfully appointed as
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a justice court judge for Mr. Pett's case if he leaves the district based on UCA §78A-7208 is false. UCA §78A-7-208 states:
If a judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may appoint another
justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial district to serve as a
temporary justice court judge. A retiredjustice court judge may also be appointed
as a temporary justice court judge under rule of the Supreme Court.
There is nothing in UCA §78A-7-208 that states, suggests, or even implies that once a
man or woman has been lawfully appointed as a justice court judge, the appointment
becomes null and void if he or she no longer resides withiug the judicial district, as the
appellees falsely claim. UCA §78A-7-208 only applies to the appointment of a justice
court judge. It does not address how a justice court judge, once lawfully appointed, can
be removed from his or her position as a justice court judge.
The truth of the matter is that the appellees have no idea of how a justice court
judge may be removed from office after he or she has been lawfully appointed, and that
fact is evident from the appellees' false assertion that UCA §78A-7-208 states that a
justice court judge may only hold office so long as he or she resides within the judicial
district.
Contrary to the assertions of the appellees, temporary justice court judges must be
appointed for each case in which the regular justice court judge cannot act as the justice
court judge. They cannot be appointed without duration, as the Box Elder County
Commission attempted to do with Marx. Temporary justice court judges are appointed
for each individual case to avoid the veiy problem that is the issue in this case.
Because Marx was indisputably allegedly appointed as a "temporaryjustice court
judge " for all of the past cases, in which he was involved, and future cases, in which he
might be involved in Box Elder County, not just Mr. Pett's case, and because that alleged
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appointment was "indefinite, " his alleged appointment as a justice court judge in Box
Elder County is void as a matter of law, because it amounts to a lifetime appointment, in
direct violation of UCA §20A-12-201(l)(a).
As set forth in Mr. Pett's Opening Brief, UCA §20A-12-201(l)(a) specifies:
(1) (a) Each judicial appointee to a court is subject to an unopposed retention
election at the first general election held more than three years after the judge or
justice was appointed.
POINT III
MARX MAY HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED TO ACT AS A JUSTICE COURT
JUDGE WITHIN HIS JURISDICTION, I.E., HYDE PARK AND NORTH
LOGAN, BUT HIS JURISDICTION WAS NOT BOX ELDER COUNTY, AND
CHRISTENSEN COULD NOT APPOINT HIM AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE
IN BOX ELDER COUNTY.
In point 2 of their brief, the appellees falsely assert that the Utah Constitution,
Article VIII, § 1, UCA §78A-M01, UCA §78A-2-202, and UCA §78A-2-201 provides:
[Tjhat a temporary judge is qualified to perform core functions injustice courts,
so long as they are a justice court judge within the judicial district or, or a retired
judge appointed by the appointing authority. (Appellee's brief, page 20, \ 2).
The appellees then, citing Ohms, supra, go on to state: i(Legislative authority, however,
l

does not extend to a legislative body the discretion to determine who has authority to

exercise that jurisdiction. '" Then based on the referenced quote taken from Ohms, which
is not relevant to any issue in this case, the appellees make following illogical and
patently false statement:
Thus, the local legislative body appointment process should not be extended to
create discretion to appoint a temporary judge for each misdemeanor case where
the judge is deemed absent or disqualified. (Appellees brief, page 21, ^f 1).
Contrary to the appellees' assertion, a temporary justice court judge must be appointed
for each case on which the regular justice court judge is unable to act as judge, or at the
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veiy least a temporaiy justice court judge has to be appointed for a specified duration. As
set forth in Mr. Pett's Opening Brief, temporaiy is not a synonym for indefinite. Black's
Law Dictionaiy defines "temporary" as: 'That which is to last for a limited time only, as
distinguishedfrom that which is perpetual or indefinite, in its durations. " Thus,
"temporaiy" is the opposite of "indefinite."
The appointment of a man or woman as a "temporary justice court judge " for an
"indefinite " period is an oxymoron. An individual cannot be both appointed as a
"temporary justice court judge " and also have that appointment be "indefinite. "
The appellees next assert, without any authority for their assertion, that justice
courts have the authority to adopt procedures in harmony with the apparent intent of
statutes or rules. While, justice courts may have some minor leeway to adopt minor
procedures that do not contradict the provisions of the Utah Code or the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, they do not have any authority to ignore any provision of the Utah
Code or the Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to adopt any procedure that contradicts,
amends, or supplants any provision of the Utah Code or the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The appellees then admit that Marx was assigned Mr. Pett's case by Chiistensen
before any attempt was made to appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder
County. Mr. Pert filed his Petition for Extraordinary Relief on December 1, 2008, and
Christensen acknowledged that Marx had no legal authority to act as a justice court judge
in Mr. Pett's case by attempting to have Marx appointed a temporaiy judge at the first
Box Elder Commissioners meeting on December 8, 2008 after Mr. Pert Petition filed his
Petition for Extraordinary Relief on December 1, 2008.
Although Marx may have been authorized to act as a justice court judge in Hyde
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Park and North Logan at the time Chiistensen assigned him to act as a justice court judge
in Mr. Pett's case, Marx was not authorized to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder
County. Before Marx could be assigned to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case,
Marx first had to be lawfully appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. He
could not be assigned to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case and then be
appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County after he had been assigned by
Chiistensen to act as a justice court judge, even assuming, arguendo, Chiistensen had any
authority to assign Marx to act as a justice court judge, which he did not. Therefore,
Marx was never authorized to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case before the
Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint him as a justice court judge on
December 8, 2008, and contrary to the appellees' assertion, there was no appointment to
complete on December 8, 2008. (Appellees' brief page 21, ^ 3).
Although the appellees claim that Chiistensen received a call from the state
"asking the courts to make sure that their judges are - -properly appointed, " and that
"the court administrator's office is concerned about it, " (Commission Hearing transcript,
page 3, line 20-22), there is no evidence whatsoever that the Administrative Office of the
Courts ever contacted Chiistensen, or that the Administrative Office of the Courts
was "asking the courts to make sure that their judges are - -properly appointed. " The
puipose of the requirements of §78A-7-202(3)(a) is to insure that justice court judges are
properly appointed. And if in fact the Administrative Office of the Court was "asking the
courts to make sure that their judges are - -properly appointed, " it would do so in a
letter, not in a phone call to Chiistensen.
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POINT IV
CONTRARY TO THE APPELLEES' ASSERTION, CHRISTENSEN
UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED HIS JUDICIAL POWER TO MARX.
The appellees falsely claim that Christensen was lawfully entitled to assign his
judicial duties to Marx. The appellees falsely claim that because Marx was a justice
court judge in Hyde Park and North Logan, he was a justice court judge in Box Elder
County, even though they also admit that "[T]he appointment process was required to
complete the assignment of conflict cases..,. " (Appellees' brief page, 22, ^s 1 and 2).
The Appellees also falsely claim that this case is distinguishable from Holm v.
Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 147 (Ut. App. 1992), because the appointment of a commissioner is
dissimilar to one justice court judge assigning another justice court judge cases even
though he or she has not been appointed to act as a justice court judge in the court or in
the county. In so doing, the appellees deliberately misstate the facts and the ruling in
Smilowitz.
In Smilowitz, the commissioner was in fact lawfully appointed as a commissioner
in the court, unlike Marx who was not lawfully appointed as a justice court judge in Box
Elder County. Smilowitz did not, as the appellees falsely claim, deal with the
appointment of the commissioner. The ruling in Smilowitz was that a judge could not
assign his judicial duties to a person who was not a judge. Smilowitz is directly on point
with this case because just as the judge in Smilowitz could not assign his judicial duties
to a person who was not a judge, Christensen could not assign his judicial duties to Marx
who was not a justice court judge in Box Elder County, irrespective of whether or not he
was a justice court judge in Hyde Park and North Logan.
A justice court judge only has authority within his or her jurisdiction. UCA §78A7-104(1). Because Marx had no judicial authority outside of Hyde Park or North Logan,
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he was a not a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and Christensen could not
delegate his judicial authority to Marx. Because Christensen unlawfully delegated his
judicial authority to Marx, nothing Marx did, while acting as a justice court judge in Box
Elder County is valid.
POINT V
THE ATTEMPTED APPOINTMENT OF MARX AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE
DID NOT, AND AS A MATTER OF LAW, CANNOT VALIDATE ANY OF
MARX'S RULINGS, DECISIONS OR OTHER ACTIONS, THAT OCCURRED
PRIOR TO HIS ATTEMPTED APPOINTMENT AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE
IN BOX ELDER COUNTY.
The appellees next falsely claim that Kasteler v. Gibbons 080207 UTCA, holds
that an assignment of a case by one justice court judge to another justice court judge can
be retroactively validated. That assertion is another deliberate misrepresentation of the
facts and the holding of Kasteler .
In making their false claim that Kasteler holds that an assignment of a case by one
justice court judge to another justice court judge can be retroactively validated, the
appellees also falsely state the facts of Kasteler. The appellees falsely claim:
The facts of Kasteler state that the entire case was first transferred to a
neighboring jurisdiction (the Holladay Justice Court) and a substitute judge
(Judge Daniel Gibbons), rather than keeping the case within the jurisdiction,
(Appellees' brief, page 23, ^ 1).
That assertion is a deliberate false representation to this Court. Mr. Kastler's cases were
not transferred to the Holladay Justice Court. Judge Johnson simply assigned Judge
Gibbons to act as the justice court judge in Mr. Kastler's cases. Mr. Kastler's cases did
not become Holladay Justice Court cases because Judge Johnson assigned Judge Gibbons
to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Kastler's cases.
Judge Linberg did not order Mr. Kastler's cases transferred back to the South Salt
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Lake Justice Court. She ordered the Mayor of South Salt Lake to appoint a justice court
judge to hear Mr. Kastler's cases, because Judge Johnson had no authority to appoint
Gibbons as a justice court judge.
The appellees also falsely represent the relevant ruling from Kasteler . Judge
Lindberg vacated the appointment of Judge Gibbons because Judge Johnson had no
authority to appoint Gibbons as a justice court judge in South Salt Lake, and Judge
Lindberg directed the South Salt Lake Mayor to appoint a substitute justice court judge to
hear Kasteler's cases. Judge Lindberg specifically cited to UCA 78-5-138, in vacating
the appointment of Gibbons, and when instructing the Salt Lake Mayor to appoint a
substitute justice court judge to hear Mr. Kasteler's cases. Just as Judge Johnson was not
empowered to appoint Judge Gibbons as a justice court judge in South Salt Lake,
Christensen was not empowered to appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder
County. Just as the Mayor of South Salt Lake was required to comply with the provisions
of UCA 78-5-138, when appointing a temporaiy justice court judge to hear Mr. Kasteler's
cases, the Box Elder County Commission was required to comply with the provisions of
UCA §78A-7-202 in order to appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County
before Marx could act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, in Mr. Pett's case or
any other cases.
POINT VI
MR. PETT CANNOT CITE TO THE RECORD OF A COURT THAT IS NOT A
COURT OF RECORD, WHICH WILL NOT PERMIT HIM TO EVEN LOOK AT
HIS FILE.
The appellees assert that Mr. Pett's claims should be denied because he has not
cited to the record to show what rulings Marx made, what decisions he made, what
judgments he entered, what sentences he imposed, what fines he imposed or what other
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actions he may have taken before the Box Elder County Commission attempted to
appoint him as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. The appellees are demanding
that Mr. Pett cite to the record of a court that is not a court of record.
Justice courts are not courts of record, UCA §78A-7-101. Therefore, it is
impossible for Mr. Pett to cite to the nonexistent records. Furthennore, even if the justice
courts were courts of record, the Box Elder County justice court is the only court in the
state in which Mr. Pett's counsel cannot review the court's file. Neither Mr. Pett nor any
of his attorneys are permitted to see Mr. Pett's court file. If Mr. Pett or his attomeys want
something from the court's file, they have to tell the clerks what it is they want from the
file, and the clerks will then decide if they can have it. But under no circumstance is
either Mr. Pett or his attorneys ever entitled to review the court's file to see what is in it.
Because the Box Elder justice court is not a court of record, and because neither
Mr. Pett nor his attorneys are permitted to even see the court's file on Mr. Pett, it is
impossible for Mr. Pett to cite to the record of the justice court. Because it is impossible
for Mr. Pett to cite to the record of the justice court, that is not a court of record, this
Court cannot logically or lawfully require him to cite to nonexistent records.

POINT VII
MARX WAS NOT A DE FACTO JUDGE PRIOR TO THE ATTEMPT BY THE
BOX ELDER COUNTY COMMISSION TO APPOINT HIM AS A JUSTICE
COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY.
The appellees have waived any right they may have had to claim that Marx was a
de facto judge, because they failed to raise that claim in the trial court. The Supreme
Court, as well as this Court, has repeatedly and consistently held that a claim that was not
raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
In State ex rel. D.B. v. State. 2010 UT App 111, 20080837-CA (UTCA) 2010 UT
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App 111, this Court, citing Main St. v. Easy Heat. Inc.. 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004) stated:
To preserve an issue for appeal the issue must have been presented to the trial
court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. See 438
Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^51, 99 P.3d 801. "Thispreservation
rule has been extended to apply to every claim unless a [party] can demonstrate
that exceptional circumstances exist or plain error occurred." hunt v. Lance, 2008
UT App 192, Tj 23, 186 P.3d 978 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Issues that are not raised at trial are generally deemed to be waived. See
438 Main St., 2004 UT 72, \ 51.
Because the appellees did not claim in the trial court that Mara was a defacto judge, they
are precluded from doing so for the first time on this appeal. Therefore, the appellees'
assertion that Mara was any sort of de facto judge must be summarily dismissed.
However, assuming, arguendo, that the appellees were entitled to assert for the
first time on Appeal that Mara was a de facto judge in Bo* Elder County prior to the time
the Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint him as a justice court judge in
Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, the facts of the case and the relevant law proves
that Mara was not a de facto judge in Box Elder County, as the appellees falsely claim.
The appellees improperly cite to Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 853 (Utah
1990) as authority for their spurious and disingenuous conclusion that Mara actions prior
to his attempted appointment by the Box Elder County Commission as a justice court
judge are valid because he was a "defacto judge." In so doing the appellees misstate
both the facts of Ohms, the holding of Ohms, and the facts of this case.
The appellees correctly state that the Ohms court stated:
A judge defacto is defined as:
One who holds and exercises the office of a judge under color of lawful authority
and by a title valid on its face, though he has not full right to the office, as where
he was appointed under an unconstitutional statute, or by an usurper of the
appointing power, or has not taken the oath of office.
However, the definition of a de facto judge set forth in Ohms does not support the
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appellees' assertion that, under the facts of this case, Marx can be considered a de facto
judge with respect to any of his actions, in any cases, in which he was involved prior to
the Box Elder County Commission's attempt to appoint him as a justice court judge in
Box Elder County on December 8, 2008.
It is indisputable that Marx was not appointed under an unconstitutional statute. It
is also undisputable that Marx was not appointed by anyone who usurped any appointing
power. There was never any attempt to "appoint" Marx as a justice court judge in Box
Elder County, prior to the December 8, 2008, attempt by the Box Elder County
Commission to appoint him. Marx was simply assigned cases by Christensen in total
disregard of the appointment process mandated in UCA §78A-7-202. And he was simply
assigned cases by Christensen because Christensen believes that he can do whatever he
wants in the Box Elder County justice court, and the laws do not apply to him.
/ would hope that it - - more than anything, it wouldjust be who I feel comfortable
with. I mean, I don 7 know that it's - - // doesn 7 say that it's my decision, but I - I - -... So it 'sjust —it's purely from my side that I've brought Judge Marx in.
(County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 12, line 4-14).
/ think its just been done and nobody has taken - - care is not the right word....
It's never really been thought about. You know, we deal with so many codes and
so many things every day, I think it's just something that was never really thought
about before. (County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 9, lines 2-12).
Clearly Christensen's own statements prove there was never any attempt to
appoint Marx as a justice court judge because Christensen never thought there was any
need to comply with the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202. Christensen does not claim that
he was unaware of the requirements of UCA §78A-7-202, that mandate how a justice
court judge must be appointed. He simply states that he didn't really care about the
requirements of UCA §78A-7-202, and never really thought about them because he has to
deal with so many codes and things eveiy day.
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Christensen is a justice court judge and an attorney. He was appointed as a justice
court judge, and, therefore, cannot claim he was unaware of the procedure and process
required to appoint justice court judges.
Christensen does not claim that he ever attempted to appoint Marx as a justice
court judge in Box Elder County. Christensen states that he had Marx come in because
he thinks he, rather the appointing authority under UCA §78A-7-202, is entitled to decide
who should be a justice court judge in Box Elder County if he is disqualified.
I would hope that it - - more than anything, it wouldjust be who I feel comfortable
with. I mean, I don 7 know that it's - - it doesn 7 say that it's my decision, but I -I - -... So it 'sjust - - it's purely from my side that I 've brought Judge Marx in.
(County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 12, line 4-14).
Marx was apparently appointed as a justice court judge, and although he does not
claim to be an attorney, he does claim to have a jurist doctorate, from Concord Online
Law School. Given the fact that Marx was apparently appointed to be a justice court
judge, he also cannot claim he did not know the procedure and process for the
appointment of a justice court judge. Therefore, he cannot claim that he did not know
that he had to be appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County before he was
entitled to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County.
Both Christensen and Marx simply chose to ignore the provisions of Rule 29
URCriP and UCA §78A-7-202, that specify how a justice court judge must be appointed
when a justice court judge is disqualified, recuses himself or herself, or is unable to act as
a justice court judge. They did so because they simply do not believe that they are
required to comply with either the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP or UCA §78A-7-202.
/ think its just been done and nobody has taken - - care is not the right word....
It rs never really been thought about. You know, we deal with so many codes and
so many things every day, I think it 'sjust something that was never really thought
about before. (County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 9, lines 2-12).
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Because no one ever usurped any appointment power of the appointing authority
under the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202, and because, admittedly, there was never any
attempt to usurp any appointment power of the appointing authority under the provisions
of UCA §78A-7-202, the appellees assertion that Marx was a de facto justice court judge
prior to the Box Elder County Commissions attempt to appoint him as a justice court
judge on December 8, 2008, is factually incorrect, and is incorrect as a matter of law.
Because neither Rule 29, URCriP nor UCA §78A-7-202 require that a justice court
judge appointed to act as a judge in a jurisdiction where the regular justice court judge
has been disqualified, recused himself or herself, or is unable to act as justice court judge
take an oath of office, that portion of the Ohms stating that a de facto may be one who
has been properly appointed but has not taken the oath of office, is irrelevant, and cannot
be said to qualify Marx as a de facto justice court judge.
The appellees next claim that Marx should be considered a de facto "officer"
under the holding of Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983). The appellees claim
that Marx should be considered a de facto officer because, they assert:
[H]e was transferred Petitioner's case pursuant to Rule 29 while he held a judicial
office within the district. The assignment of the Petitioner's case, in accordance
with Rule 29, constitutes a circumstance of reputation or acquiescence calculated
to induce the parties, without any inquiry to submit to his position as a judicial
officer.
That assertion is another false representation of the facts on the part of the appellees and
yet another misrepresentation of the applicable law.
As this Court made clear in Kasteler, supra, and as mandated by Judge Lindberg,
under the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP, and UCA 78-5-138, the Mayor of South Salt
Lake had to first appoint a substitute justice court judge to hear Kasteler's cases, and then
Kasteler's cases could be assigned to a justice court judge who was lawfully appointed,
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as required by UCA 78-5-138. The Mayor of South Salt Lake could not, after the fact,
appoint Judge Gibbons, who had already been assigned by Judge Johnson to hear
Kasteler's cases, as a justice court judge to hear his cases, otherwise, Judge Lindberg
would not have vacated Judge Gibbons assignment as the justice court judge in Kasteler's
cases. She would have simply told the Mayor of South Salt Lake to ratify Judge's
appointment of Judge Gibbons as the justice court judge in Kasteler's cases by appointing
him a justice court judge in South Salt Lake. Therefore, under the law as established in
Kasteler. Marx was not lawfully transferred Mr. Pett's case pursuant to either Rule 29
URCriP or UCA §78A-7-202.
Contrary to the appellees' assertion, Christensen's unlawful assignment of cases to
Marx was not in accordance with the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP, and they were not a
"circumstance of reputation or acquiescence to induce the parties, without any inquiry,
'to submit to his position as a judicial officer. " No defendant who ever appeared before
Marx was "induced" into submitting to his alleged position as a judicial officer. All
defendants, including Mr. Pert were forced into going into court with Marx acting as a
justice court judge in Box Elder County. They did not acquiesce in Marx acting as a
justice court judge. They had no choice as to whether or not to submit to his unlawful
presence in the Box Elder justice court.
The appellees cannot seriously claim that defendants, especially defendants in the
"justice court system," are sophisticated enough to have any idea that the person wearing
the black robe may not be a lawful justice court judge, and that they have the right to
question the person's authority to act as a justice court judge. Therefore, no defendant
who appeared before Marx could knowingly and voluntarily acquiesce to Marx acting as
a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and without acquiescence on the part of the

-21-

defendants, even under the appellees' false representations of the facts, Marx cannot be
deemed to have acted as a de facto justice court judge.
Marx's knowing and willful violation of the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202,
cannot be construed to promote the interests of justice for either the public or the
unwitting defendants who were forced to appear before him and were subjected to his
unlawful acts. The holdings of Olms and Fordham. supra, require that in order for a
person to be considered a "defact officer, " the interests of public policy and justice must
be advanced, as well as the interests of the people affected. No one can seriously claim
that pemiitting judges to flout the law promotes the interests of public policy and justice
or benefits defendants who are unaware they are being forced to appear before someone
who is not a lawfully appointed judge. Therefore, under the holdings of Olms and
Fordham. Marx cannot be considered to be a de facto justice court judge, prior to his
attempted appointment.
However, even if Marx could be considered to be a de facto justice court judge in
the other cases in which he unlawfully acted as a justice court judge, he cannot be
deemed to be a defacto justice court judge in this case. Mr. Pert objected to Marx's
authority to act as a justice court judge in his case as soon as Marx was appointed.
Therefore, just as commissioner Peuler could not be considered a de facto justice court
judge in Mr. Olms case, Marx cannot be deemed to be a de facto judge in this case.
POINT VIII
THE APPELLEES HAVE WAIVED ANY RIGHT THEY MAY HAVE HAD TO CLAIM
MR. PETT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF.
Even assuming, auguendo, that Mr. Pert did not have standing to file his Petition
for Extraordinary Relief, the appellees have waived that issue by failing to raise it in the
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trial court. See State ex rel. D.B. v. State, and Main St. v. Easy Heat. Inc.. supra. The
appellees have not cited, and cannot cite, this to the record of this case where they
asserted Mr. Pett does not have standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief.
They have not done so because they cannot do so, because they never made any such
assertion in the trial court. Therefore, they have waived that claim and cannot raise it for
the first time on appeal.
In State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880. 886 (Utah App. 1990). citing State v.
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), this Court stated that standing is not a
jurisdictional doctrine but rather a substantive doctrine, that is waived if it is not asserted
in the trial court. This Court then went on to state, again citing Schlosser. supra, that
standing is a claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and that standing
had been waived in Schlosser because it had not been raised in the trial court.
Because it is indisputable, that the appellees did not raise the issue of Mr. Pett's
standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the trial court, they are now
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal.
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the appellees are entitled to assert that
Mr. Pett lacked standing to file his petition for Extraordinary Relief, Mr. Pett indisputably
has standing to do so.
As soon as Marx appeared in court claiming to be the justice court judge in Mr.
Pett's case Mr. Pett challenged Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in Box
Elder County. Mr. Pett even filed a Motion to Disqualify Marx because he was not
qualified to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. Marx simply ignored the
Motion.
Marx also entered a ruling disqualifying Mr. Pett's attorney from representing him.

Marx denied Mr. Pett's Request for a Bill of Particulars. Marx denied Mr. Pett's Motion
to Compel Discovery from both the Brigham City Prosecutor and the Brigham City
Police Department. Marx denied Mr. Pett's Motion to Disqualify Michael Christiansen
from prosecuting him based on Christiansen's conflict of interest in acting as the
prosecutor while at the same time the law firm for which he works represents the
witnesses, and complainants in Mr. Pett's case. All of these mlings were made before the
Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint Marx as a justice court judge on
December 8, 2008. Therefore, Mr. Pett clearly has suffered distinct and palpable injuries
that give him standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The attempted appointment of Marx as a justice court judge was unlawful because
the Box Elder County Commission failed to comply with the provisions of UCA §78A-7202(3 )(a), requiring the Commission to report his name to the Judicial Council, because
the Box Elder County Attorney had not written a letter to the Judicial Council stating that
in his opinion, Marx meets the statutory qualifications for the office of a justice court
judge in Box Elder county, as mandated by UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b), because the Judicial
Council had not certified Marx to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, as
mandated by UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b), and because Christensen could not delegate his
judicial authority to Marx. The attempted appointment of Marx as a justice court judge
was also unlawful because Marx was appointed as a temporary justice court judge with
an indefinite term, in violation of Utah law.
Marx was not a de facto justice court judge prior to his attempted appointment,
and the appellees have waived any right they may have had to claim he was when they
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failed to make that assertion in the trial court.
Mr. Pert had standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief because he has
clearly suffered distinct and palpable injuries as a result of Marx's unlawful actions.
Because Marx's attempted appointment as a justice court judge in Box Elder
County was unlawful, and because Marx camiot be considered as a de facto justice court
judge, for any case, this Court must reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand this
case back to the trial court with instructions to enter an order declaring that Marx was not
lawfully appointed as a justice court judge by the Box Elder County Commission on
December 8, 2008, that the Box Elder County Commission could not retroactively
validate ChristenseiTs appointment of Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County,
and that the Box Elder County Commission could not retroactively validate any of
Marx's rulings made, orders entered, judgments entered, fines assessed, penalties
assessed, jail time imposed, or any other purported legal actions engaged in by Marx,
while purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of
his attempted appointment as a justice court judge in Box Eder County on December 8,
2008.
Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ _ a a y of June 2010.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Robert Pert
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I hereby certify that on t h e ^ l day of June 2010, I HAND DELIVERED two
copies of this Brief to:
Stephen R. Hadfield
9 West Forest Street, Ste. 310
Brigham City, Utah 84302, and
Michael Christiansen
98 North Mam
Brigham City, Utah 84302.
I also mailed two copies of this Brief to David Marx at 2076 North 1200 East, North
Logan, Utah 84321.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Robert Pert
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P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2

COMMISSIONER HARDING

Lee's go ahead

Tell

us about the appointment of David Marx as a justice
5

court

judge.

6

STEVEN HADFIELD

It's my -- it's my

7

understanding that tne Justice Court occasionally has a

8

need to have another judge come and fill in, whether

9

there's a conflict, whether the judge is out of town,

10

whatever the circumstance may be.

11
12

I think what we're here to do today is just
to have that appointment made so that that judge can

13
14

The statute says that the appointing

15

authority is the Chairman of the County Commission,

16

that should be you.

17

Once the appointment's made, a majority of

18

the legislative body, which would be three of you,

19

confirms the appointment

20

we're here for.

21

Is that right 9

22

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN

And so I think that's what

Yeah

We're -- m

fact,

23

a temporary justice court judge as opposed to pro tern.

24

Yeah

25

another judge

There's -- there's two ways to bring m

T-T^TT

a --

One is througn the Supreme Court, and

"M^CDDT1

DT7DHDT"T\Tn

435)586-0830

^)

1

chat's the pro tern process.

2

The ocher way is just to appoint a temporary

3

justice courc judge.

4

any kind of a cime frame just to back up mostly for

5

cases where I have to recuse myself.

6

Temporary justice -- doesn't give

It's not being different from what we've been

7

doing in the past as far as somebody coming in and

8

start doing my work for me or anything like that.

9

just that we wanted to make him official per the code

10

is all.

11
12

It's

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

Well, now, look, we

have appointed replacements in the past.

13

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

We had -- years ago, we

14

had Judge Nelson sworn in.

15

tern.

16

sure if that was really per the code, but that's what

17

we had done.

18

I think he was called pro

That's what the courts were doing then.

I'm not

I -- I got a phone call last week that the

19

state is actually asking the courts to make sure that

20

their judges are -- are properly appointed.

21

this comes from the state level to -- the court

22

administrator's office is concerned about it.

23
24
25

And so

So we just wanted to make it per the code is
all.
COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

HIGH DESERT REPORTING

So, Steven, was there a

/^ T r \

rn/-

/•»

1

I change in the code or just this is brought to our

2

I awareness, and we need to take action on it?

3

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE VOICE:

4

STEVEN HADFIELD:

(Inaudible.)

There was a change, but

5

I -- I think it was the same before the change.

6

look at the code today, there's a section that's

7

effective from the first of this year until the end,

8

and then it changes again next year.
So

9

If you

there was a change the first of the year,

10

but I think it was -- and I haven't researched it out,

11

but I think it was probably the same requirement.

12

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

What's the

13

period?

14

appoint and then they're appointed until

15

released?

16

Do you appoint on a calendar year or do you

STEVEN HADFIELD:

17

really no

18

definition of temporary.

19

appointing

they're

It just says -- and there's

-- it's says temporary, and there's really no

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

I —

I think probably

20

until they're released because the pro tern process

21

comes down from the Supreme Court, that makes it clear

22

that it's on a per case basis just for that case.

23

they have to be sworn in as a pro tern on each

24

individual case as opposed to this.

25

that

And

And so where they don't say per case, then I

think chat we're good jusn until it runs out or until
2

| we decide otherwise.

3

|

STEVEN KADFIELD:

I would agree with that.

COMMISSIONER HARDING:
5

I than one temporary --

6
7

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

If -- if you're going to

be using --

8
9

Would we appoint more

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

-- justice

court

judge?

10

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

If you're going to be

11

using three or four throughout, you know, depending on

12

the circumstances, you'd probably want to appoint more

13

than one.

14

All right.

I think Peggy and I can talk

15

about that.

16

don't know that we need to do that

17

We'll look at that maybe down the road.

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

today.

And it's usually -- it's

18

just if you have a conflict or if you have an overload

19

or - -

20

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

I

I -- P v e

never had a

21

judge come in and do work for me when I've been out of

22

town.

23

conflict, not an overload, just to come in for a couple

24

of hours to help me out in a case where

25

recuse myself.

So it would just be when I -- when I've got a
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COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

Okay.

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

2

My question is

3

obviously require -- requirements is -- he's, I assume,

4

a certified

judge?

KEVIN CHRISTENSSN:

5

Yes.

He's currently --

6

the -- che court requires that we bring in a judge who

7

is currently a judge within the First Judicial

8

District, which is Box Elder, Cache or Rich Counties.

9

Judge Marx is at Hyde Park over in Cache

10

County; so he qualifies under the code uo come in.

11

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

And so the

12

qualifications of -- of using him or anybody that they

13

have to be in the First --

14
15

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

They have to be in the

First District, and they have to be a sitting judge.

16

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

17

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

18
19
20

or -- or

They can be a retired

judge, I think it says.
COMMISSIONER HARDING:
to have the

-- or -- but they have

certification?

21

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

22

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

23

COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:

24

The boundaries have changed.

25

jurisdiction.

Exactly.
Yes.
And that's changed.

It used to be your

Right?
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KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:
2

mean, I've

3

I've

4

Box Elder County.

5

District

Because, I

-- I've nad Judge Russell come over, and

gone over to Logan.

So my jurisdiction has been

I think it's always said First

_'d have to look.
STEVEN HADFIELD:

6

Well, no.

The -- the state

if

7

you're -- the state divides the -- if the state's

8

divided into judicial districts for the First, Weber

9

County is the Second, and then you've got the Third;

10

that would be Salt Lake.

11

judicial districts.

12

And so it talks about

So the statute refers to a judge from our

13

judicial district.

14

district, and I think that's probably been the case all

15

along.

16

the case now.

So it'd be anywhere within

that

I'm not sure about that, but I think so.

COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:

17

This is -- this is

18

only a question.

19

requirement by ordinance or by statutes, we're

20

in the 11th month of the year.

21

since January.

If this -- if this has been a
-- we're

It's been in place

22

I'm curious as to why it's coming now --

23

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

24

COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:

25

It is

Well ---as

opposed to

'anuary?
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1

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

Ii's -- well, I think

2

it's probably been in place before January.

3

has just been done and nobody has taken -- care is not

4

the right word.

5

I think it

But the -- the attorneys who have come in and

6

the defendants who have come in have always just felt

7

comfortable bringing in another judge.

8

It's never been questioned.

9

really been thought about.

It's never

You know, we deal with so

10

many codes and so many things every day, I think it's

11

just something that has just never really been thought

12

about before.

13

It had been brought to our attention like

14

this after the state or administrator's office -- it's

15

been brought to our attention through a pending case.

16

And so we jusc want to make sure that it's -- it's done

17

right.

18

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

So, Steve, as I

19

understand it then, the appointment would be to appoint

20

David Marx as a temporary justice court judge, and then

21

that appointment is

22

indefinite?

STEVEN HADFISLD:

That's right.

23

j

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

24

|

STEVEN HADF1ELD:

25

That's right.

Yes.

And the

is made by the chairman, and then that

HIGH DESRPT
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appointment

appointment

u
be -- would be confirmed by a vo:e of the commission.
2

I

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

So we take a motion on

3

f thai or do we have further -- or does che chairman make
a recommendation to us that --

5

j

6

I appoint

7

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

judge, and then there would be a confirming vote taken.
LUANN ADAMS:

9

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

How do we do that?
Yeah.

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

LUANN ADAMS:

14

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

We need a notification of that.

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

17

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

20

could do

21

chair's

22

24
25

I think you could.
-- and then -- and

then go ahead and affirm and appoint and sign?

19

23

Should I ask for a

vote now and --

16

18

It sounds different,

what we're

13

15

How do we do

that?

11
12

would

-- on the record, appoint the judge as the

8

10

The chairman

Well,

I think what we

is we could make a motion to approve

the

recommendation.
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

I believe that would

work.
COMMISSIONER DAVIS:
motion chac we approve --

Okay.

I -- I make a

1

I

COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:

2

I uhaz, I have a question.

3

|

Before we gee to

Are there other -- other potential
on

the list?

appointees

Hopefully, one thac's not as far away as

5

| Cache Valley.

6

I

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

Hyde Park.

Yeah.

We --

7

Judge Nelson from Mantua has come in and helped before.

8

Judge Marx is law trained, and so

9

comfortable bringing him in on a lot of the cases.

10

Some of the cases where I have to recuse

11

myself are sometimes more complicated than others.

12

I've

13

do the cases.

I feel more

And

just felt real comfortable having him come in to

14

I think he does a good job.

So, I mean, if, sometime down the road, you

15

wanted to look at different people, I guess that would

16

be a possibility too.

17

STEVEN HADFIELD:

Commissioner Van Dyke, are

18

you asking shall we ask for competing proposals or a

19

bid contracting for professional

20

services?

There's not that requirement.

So, you know,

21

based upon the judge's experience or the county

22

attorney's experience, oftentimes we'll contract for

23

professional

24
25

services.

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

Yeah.

I -- I don't know

that it would be applicable in a case like this.

HIGH
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COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:

1
2

requiremenc.

3

Obviously, ic's not a

I see it is a .

KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

I don't know what

4

proposal they would ever make.

5

I don't think it's a -- a money issue.
So I don't think they'd be saying I can do it

6

7

I mean, I don't -- I --

for this much.

I would hope that it -- more than

anything, it would just be who I feel comfortable with.
9

I mean, I don't know that it's -- it doesn't

10

say that it's my decision, but I -- I -- I know the

11

other judges in the other district just felt real

12

comfortable with him coming in.

13

purely just from my side that I've brought Judge Marx

14

in .

15

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

So it's just -- it's

Okay.

I think we got

16

this right.

17

I would like to make a recommendation that we appoint

18

David Marx as a temporary justice or judge.

I'm gonna' try.

With what you've told me,

19

Now I would like to have a motion --

20

COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

I'll

-- I'll make the

21

motion to approve the recommendation from the chair of

22

the appointment of David Marx as temporary

23

court judge for Box Elder Councy.

24
25

COMMISSIONER HARDING:

justice

I have a motion.

Do I

have a second?

'«icl ror
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COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:
with this

And I've

(inaudible) at the 11th hour.

struggled

It's very --

well, that's enough.
COMMISSIONER HARDING:
motion.

I'll

second the

All in favor say aye.
(Ayes voiced.)
COMMISSIONER HARDING:
COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

The motion carries.
Did you vote for him

then?
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:
COMMISSIONER HARDING:
COMMISSIONER DAVIS:
you?

No, I didn't.
He voted to --

You didn't mean to, did

Three should be enough.
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE:

So that would be a

nay.
COMMISSIONER DAVIS:

Nay.

COMMISSIONER HARDING:
carries.

Okay.

Okay.

Motion

Thank you.
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN:

Okay.

I do appreciate
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20A-12-201. Judicial appointees - Retention elections.
(1) (a) Each judicial appointee to a court is subject to an unopposed
retention election at the first general election held more than three years after
the judge or justice was appointed.

UCA §78A-2-202
Vacancy.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Appointing authority" means:
(i) for a county:
(A) the chair of the county commission in a county operating under the county
commission or expanded county commission form of county government;
(B) the county executive in a county operating under the county executive-council
form of county government; and
(C) the county manager in a county operating under the council-manager form of
county government; and
(ii) for a city or town, the mayor of the city or town.
(b) "Local legislative body" means:
(i) for a county, the county commission or county council; and
(ii) for a city or town, the council of the city or town.
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and
confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body.
(3) (a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed, the local
legislative body shall report the confirmedjudge's name to the Judicial Council
(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications
for office.
(c) A justice court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified by the
Judicial Council

78-5-138. Temporary justice court judge.
if a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may
appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial
district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice court judge
may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under rule of the
Supreme Court.

78A-7-101. Creation of justice court — Not of record.
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is created a court not of
record known as the justice court. The judges of this court are justice court judges.

IB

78A-7-104. Justice court judge authority.
Justice court judges:
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as
judges of courts of record;
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest upon afindingof
probable cause; and
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine:
(a) probable cause for any case within their jurisdiction; and
(b) an accused person's release on bail or his own recognizance.

I

78A-7-208. Temporary justice court judge.
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority
may appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the
judicial district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice
court judge may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under
rule of the Supreme Court.

Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of venue.
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom
a trial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that
court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council,
upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the trial, may,
unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and finish the trial, but if the
assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substtute judge can
proceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new trial.
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom
a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of the
court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge
assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council maty perform those
duties.
(c)( 1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the
motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating
facts sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest.
(c)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not
later than 20 days after the last of the following:
(c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge;
(c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or
(c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise
of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the
motion is based.
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall
be filed as soon as practicable.
(c)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule

11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to the
procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion
to disqualify in an action.
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall,
without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the
motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge shall lake no further
action in the case until the motion is decided. If the judge grants the motion,
the order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no
presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign
another judge to the action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases shall
be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138. The presiding judge of the
court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the
presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge.
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely
filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, thereviewingjudge shall
assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment injustice
court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138.
(c)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may
consider any part of the record of the action and may request of the judge
who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to
questions posed by the reviewing judge.
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely
manner.
(d)(1) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is
pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth facts,
ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
(d)(2) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are
true and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for the

removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from the
objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith
to the court in the other county. If the court is not satisfied lhat the
representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal hearing in court to
resolve the matter and receive further evidence with resped to the alleged
prejudice.
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of
record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge
who shall hear the case.

